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Abstract 
 
Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to 
provide a, probably subjectively-colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game 
experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss important 
extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we 
offer a survey of the experimental ultimatum bargaining literature containing papers 
published since the turn of the century. The paper argues that the ultimatum game is an 
extremely versatile tool for research in bargaining and on social preferences. Finally, we 
provide examples for open research questions and directions for future studies. 
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When Güth presented the more recent ultimatum-like experiments, Uri Gneezy suggested 
writing a survey of more than 30 years of ultimatum bargaining research. We thank him for 
the nudge and David Bauder as well as Niklas Garnadt for excellent research assistance. We 
are extremely grateful to the magnificent members of the Economic Science Association 
Discussion List; many of them – too many to mention each by name – pointed us to scholarly 
papers that use the ultimatum game. All remaining errors and omissions are of course ours. 
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1. Introduction 
If one searches for “ultimatum bargaining” on scholar.google.com, there are more than 24,000 
results. The first result is the original article by Güth et al. (1982) that is cited more than 2,650 
times. The ISI Web of Knowledge counts almost 1000 citations for this paper. An entire 
generation of behavioral and experimental economists as well as psychologists has been 
influenced by the result that people systematically deviate from the standard prediction of 
ultimatum bargaining. Thousands of ultimatum game experiments and extensions have been 
published in the meantime. Thirty years after the publication of the first ultimatum bargaining 
experiment it is time to take stock. 
It seems almost impossible to survey in one paper the entire literature on ultimatum 
bargaining and on experiments using the ultimatum game. The sheer size of the literature is 
amazing and forces us to pursue a more moderate approach. Hence, in contrast to a traditional 
survey, the objective of this paper is threefold. First, it is intended to provide a, probably 
subjectively-colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and 
the immediate responses. Second, we discuss important extensions of the standard ultimatum 
bargaining game, and, third, we offer a survey of the experimental ultimatum bargaining 
literature containing papers published since the turn of the century1, and even that is a task 
that forces us to be eclectic in what we can cover. 
One of the authors (Kocher) vividly remembers a discussion with Amnon Rapoport, 
probably more than ten years ago, in which Amnon Rapoport claimed that the ultimatum 
game is one of the most complex games in experimental economics, much more complicated 
than games with many players, potentially incomplete information, and/or mixed strategy 
equilibria. It is a claim that becomes clearer only after a second thought: while the game 
structure is obviously one of the easiest that can be imagined (two players, two stages, 
complete information, usually small strategy spaces), the motivations behind decisions in the 
ultimatum game are extremely diverse, and it took years or even decades of research to better 
understand them. 
At the outset of the experimental research on ultimatum bargaining, towards the end of 
the 1970ies and the beginning of the 1980ies, the source for the interest in the ultimatum 
game was a bit different. The motivation was to study bargaining and to document limits of 
the traditional assumptions regarding rationality and material selfishness or opportunism. 
Whereas social dilemma games such as the prisoners’ dilemma and the public goods game 
                                            
1 Earlier surveys are Güth and Tietz (1990), Güth (1995), Roth (1995), Camerer (2003), and chapters 46, 47 as 
well as 50 in Plott and Smith (2008). 
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explore the efficiency of strategic interaction outcomes, the findings of ultimatum 
experiments more fundamentally challenge the narrow concept of material opportunism, 
namely that decision makers maximize their own payoff in each and every situation. 
Behaving non-optimally in this sense in social dilemma games can be explained by efficiency 
concerns. However, in ultimatum games where responders reject positive actual offers, i.e., 
they essentially “burn money”, efficiency concerns are also violated. Thus, the results from 
ultimatum experiments reject the narrow orthodox assumption of material opportunism, but 
they do not necessarily reject rationality in a broader sense, allowing for all sorts of aversion 
concepts, intrinsic motivations, other-regarding preferences, and emotions. It becomes 
apparent immediately why the ultimatum bargaining game had such a profound impact on 
behavioral and experimental economics and beyond, once it was out there. 
Although we still do not understand everything and, especially, cannot predict individual 
behavior in the ultimatum game, based on observables, the last 30 years have contributed to a 
better understanding of ultimatum bargaining. Nonetheless, a “ban on ultimatum 
experiments” (Camerer, 2003) seems at best premature. As will become clear below, beyond 
its immediate function as a test of bargaining theory, the ultimatum game has become a 
valuable tool or workhorse for studying a host of different research questions in economics 
and in other disciplines. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 traces the first theoretical 
discussion of ultimatum bargaining (Güth, 1976), before discussing in more detail how this 
has inspired the first ultimatum experiments, especially by confronting them with earlier 
experiments of bargaining and negotiations. Section 3 recollects the main findings of Güth et 
al. (1982) and discusses why they have received much attention and inspired many 
subsequent studies. Section 4 is devoted to modifications of take-it or leave-it offer 
bargaining. In section 5, we will mainly focus on scholarly contributions using the ultimatum 
game after the turn of the century. In section 6, we discuss some possible directions of future 
research, and section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. How it all began 
Having studied economics intensified one of the author’s (Güth) interest in fairness which he 
wanted to analyze game theoretically. In spite of the – at that time – still predominant 
cooperative game theory, he was interested in strategic games generating fair and efficient 
outcomes (see Güth, 1976, for early attempts). As most game theorists of that time, he was 
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aware of alternating concession models (Zeuthen, 1930) and how they are related to Nash’s 
(1950) bargaining solution (Harsanyi, 1959) and of alternating offer bargaining models (Ståhl, 
1972). 
A problem of the latter studies is that they appeal to often observed alternating 
concessions or agreement offers, although their solutions predict an immediate agreement due 
to the efficiency loss by delayed conflict resolution. Allowing for just one round of take-it or 
leave-it offers avoids the problem, but this was no essential reason for being interested in 
ultimatum bargaining at that time. Undoubtedly, there was an awareness of the active research 
in characteristic function experiments (see, for example, Sauermann, 1972), which were 
usually run “face-to-face” and with free from communication. Such protocols obviously allow 
for all sorts of confounding effects from physical attraction, signaling, beliefs on 
trustworthiness, to prior acquaintance, which Güth aimed to avoid or at least reduce as much 
as possible. But, although – thanks to his close relation to Reinhard Selten – he was quite 
familiar with the experimental method, it needed some “seduction” to make him study 
“ultimatum bargaining” (see Güth, 1976) experimentally. 
To the best of Güth’s memory, he mainly wanted to use a strategic model of bargaining 
and focus, for a start, on the simplest model of take-it or leave-it offers, with the option to 
later enrich it, e.g. by allowing for more complex choice sets or for more rounds of take-it or 
leave-it offers by the same party or with both parties alternating. The intuition that this might 
be an interesting topic for experimental research may have been inspired by the evidence of 
fair outcomes in the early dictator game or in reward allocation experiments (for example, 
Mikula, 1973; Shapiro, 1975). Could such fairness be observed also when allowing for the 
most elementary form of strategic interaction? 
What has finally induced Güth to actually plan an experiment which could reveal fairness 
concerns in spite of its different standard prediction, and thus would question the assumption 
of material opportunism in case of unfair proposals, similar to findings from reward allocation 
experiments? In September 1977 (Güth’s first month as a professor of economics at the 
University of Cologne), Wulf Albers and Günther Bamberg organized a workshop bringing 
together game theorists and social psychologists and trying to promote experimental research. 
They did so by offering funds for running experiments. In Güth’s case, they were successful. 
He got 1.000 German marks and immediately started preparing the first experiments, the 
ultimatum bargaining study reported in Güth et al. (1982) as well as an auction experiment 
described in Güth et al. (1983). 
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Two students (Rolf Schmittberger and Bernd Schwarze2) helped to run the experiments 
and also typed the many versions of the manuscript before the paper was finally published. 
This is how it began. Let us now describe what can be learned from it. 
 
 
3. The first findings 
The ultimatum game features a situation in which one party specifies all details of an 
agreement, and the other party can either accept or reject, where rejections imply that the 
surplus of the deal is lost.3 What renders the ultimatum game special, also when compared to 
principal-agent models, is its constant-pie-assumption. This means that the main concern of 
the game is how to distribute the rewards and that inefficiency can only be caused by 
rejection, i.e., by not reaching an agreement. 
More formally, let X be the proposer who suggests the shares x and y for him and the 
responder Y, respectively, where x and y are non-negative and add up to the positive pie size 
p. Thus, the sequential process is that, first, X chooses ( ),x y  with , 0x y ≥  and x y p+ = . 
Then, after learning the choice of ( ),x y  by X, responder Y either accepts, ( ), 1x yδ = , or 
rejects, ( ), 0x yδ = . This implies the final payoffs ( ),x y xδ  for X and ( ),x y yδ  for Y. 
Material opportunism requires that a positive actual offer y to Y must be accepted by Y, 
i.e., ( ), 1x yδ =  for 0y > . On the one hand this, however, does not exclude the existence of a 
large multiplicity of equilibria, for example, of the form 
( )  ( )   ( )( ), , , 1 if  and , 0 otherwisex y x y y y x yδ δ= ≥ =  for all y with 0 y p≤ ≤ . In other 
words, all distributions of p are justifiable as equilibrium outcomes. On the other hand, the 
elimination of weakly dominated strategies implies ( ), 1x yδ =  whenever y is positive. If this 
is anticipated, proposer X should offer responder Y at most the smallest positive amount4. 
Thus, repeated elimination of weakly dominated strategies implies that proposer X receives 
                                            
2 Bernd Schwarze finally wrote a Ph.D. thesis in experimental economics (Schwarze, 1983; see also Güth and 
Schwarze, 1983). 
3 Güth (1976) also discussed (von Stackelberg) situations where not all details of the agreement could be 
specified and some could be chosen by the responder (see Siegel and Fouraker, 1960, for an early experiment of 
such a situation). 
4 Since both, ( ),0 1pδ =  and ( ),0 0pδ = , are optimal, there is indifference in case of zero offers. 
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nearly all of p and responder Y at most the smallest positive amount. The same solution is 
implied by (subgame) perfectness of equilibria (Selten, 1965, 1975). 
As a consequence, the empirical finding of the modal offer / 2y p=  seems less 
troublesome for game theory (see Aumann, 1974, who propagates coarsening rather than 
refining the equilibrium concept) than the observation that low offers, for example in the 
region / 3y p< , are sufficiently often rejected to render such low offers unattractive for 
proposers. The rejection of positive offers y clearly questions material opportunism and 
cannot be explained by noise, mistakes, or confusion.5 
Importantly, the modal equal split offer is an extremely robust phenomenon. On average, 
players in the game tend to offer around 40-50% of the pie in the standard version of the 
game. Such offers are almost always accepted. Responders’ acceptance rates decrease with 
smaller offers, and they approach zero quite quickly for offers below 20%. From an ex post 
perspective, taking actual rejection rates into account, either the equal split or offers around 
40% are payoff maximizing for proposers (see Camerer, 2003). Most responders exhibit 
monotonic rejection strategies, although one consistently observes a small number of 
rejections of rare “superfair” offers with / 2>y p  (Güth et al., 2003).6 
The evidence from the ultimatum game clearly shows that, first, responders do not only 
care about their own monetary payoff but compare their payoff with that of the proposer and 
become frustrated when their share is much lower. Second, proposers are either aware of the 
responder’s willingness to reject unfair offers or guided by own fairness concerns when 
offering sizable or even fair7 shares for Y. 
In the spirit of the earlier reward allocation experiments it seemed that participants 
assumed equal “contributions” (since the pie was given to them like “manna from heaven”, 
i.e., as a windfall gain) and therefore wanted to share it equally8. Of course, as in almost any 
                                            
5 Rationality in making mistakes, for example by assuming that less costly mistakes are more likely (Myerson, 
1978), could account for more likely rejection of lower offers but not for the very high rejection rates of 
substantial, but unfair offers. 
6 Assuming monotonicity allows eliciting responders’ behavior by asking them for a minimum acceptable offer 
(MAO). Methodologically, it might sometimes be helpful to give no information about proposals to responders 
at all. Eliciting MAOs allows to ask for proposals and responder behavior simultaneously, without having to use 
the strategy vector method. 
7 We define the equal split (i.e., an offer of / 2y p= ) as fair. 
8 Speaking of “contributions” means to apply equity theory (see, for example, Homans, 1961) in a liberal way in 
order to make it applicable even if contributions to generate the total reward are minor or if they are only an 
aspect of belonging to the group of recipients. 
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experimental game, behavior is very heterogeneous across decision makers. Some of the 
participants in the experiment engage in backward induction and more often than not fail in 
reaching an agreement by not figuring out that its result might not be socially acceptable. 
What is taught in a game theory class or an operations research course may not be 
behaviorally optimal when fairness matters. Analytic capability is better paired with social 
intelligence.9 
There is a second part of the Güth et al. (1982) paper that is hardly ever mentioned or 
referred to. It allows for a variable pie size by asking X to allocate two stacks of differently 
colored chips with different monetary chip values in two bundles for the two players. Y can 
choose the preferred bundle, and X obtains the other bundle. In what is coined the 
“complicated ultimatum game” in the paper, equality of monetary earnings could be achieved 
efficiently and inefficiently (see Nydegger and Owen, 1975, for an early experiment using 
asymmetric chip values). The intention of exploring the complicated ultimatum game was to 
show how the ultimatum game can be enriched in order to assess additional research 
questions such as, for example, whether decision makers are mainly interested in equality or 
in both, equality and efficiency. 
Is it just the “manna-from-heaven” pie that triggers such strong fairness concerns? It 
definitely is responsible for observing / 2y p=  as the modal offer but not for offering sizable 
amounts to the responder. Güth and Tietz (1985, 1986) provided entitlements over the 
endowment (see also Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985) by auctioning the roles of proposers X and 
responders Y and observed hardly any equal split but splits of pie p in the range of / 3y p= , 
in correspondence with the twice as high role prices of proposers X compared to those of 
responders Y in the auction. Hoffman et al. (1996) allocated roles by assigning participants 
with a better quiz score to the proposer role and could also confirm an entitlement effect10, 
                                            
9 Social intelligence is something that is accumulated when growing up. The results from ultimatum games 
played by children and teenagers are somehow mixed, however (see Murnighan and Saxon, 1998; Hoffmann and 
Tee, 2006; Sutter, 2006; Steinbeis et al., 2012). The general picture from economic experiments with children 
and adolescents (see also Kocher and Sutter, 2007) tends to support the hypothesis of a development of social 
intelligence when growing up leading to higher offers and less conflict with increasing age during childhood. 
When looking at results from experiments with chimpanzees (Jensen et al., 2007), it becomes clear that their 
behavior is closest to the model of a homo oeconomicus, even though fair sharing behavior has also been 
repeatedly observed in monkeys (see e.g., Horner et al., 2011). 
10 In the sense that by one’s relatively better quiz score one feels entitled to command ultimatum power rather 
than the other, but not in the sense that ultimatum power corresponds to the difference in “contributions”. 
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weakening equal sharing of p and triggering a self-serving bias on the side of the proposer 
participants (for more recent evidence, see e.g., Gächter and Riedl, 2005). 
One important impact of the ultimatum game on research in economics tends to be easily 
overlooked. The ultimatum game has been extremely relevant as an empirical example and 
guidance for developing theoretical models of other-regarding preferences. Even if his model 
only concerns normal-form games, Rabin (1993) mentions the ultimatum game four times in 
his paper (excluding the reference list).11 Outcome-based models of other-regarding 
preferences are, of course, by far more influenced by the results from ultimatum bargaining 
experiments. Kirchsteiger (1994) mentions the game 29 times, Levine (1998) 37 times, Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) mention it 27 times, and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) 53 times (always 
excluding the reference list). Not much lower are the numbers for Charness and Rabin (2002) 
with 17 times, Falk and Fischbacher (2005) with 25 times, and Cox et al. (2007) with 26 
times.12 It seems fair to say that the impact of the ultimatum game results on the theoretical 
development of behavioral economics was significant. 
 
 
4. Let the game continue 
In the following, we focus on three sets of relevant methodological extensions of the basic 
ultimatum bargaining game. Section 4.1 discusses alternating-offer bargaining and repeated 
play of the basic game; section 4.2 provides a selection of modifications of the one-round 
game, and in section 4.3, we give an overview of ultimatum game extensions that involve 
more than two players. 
 
4.1 Multiple rounds 
An important extension of the basic one-shot ultimatum game was to introduce multiple 
rounds of – usually alternating – take-it or leave-it offers, especially since the former 
respective exercises by Ståhl (1972) and Krelle (1962) were by then supplemented by the very 
elegant studies of Rubinstein (1982, 1985). The first such experiment (Binmore et al., 1985) 
confirmed the findings of Güth et al. (1982), but mainly discussed the results of a two-round 
                                            
11 Dickinson (2000) uses an ultimatum game to test one aspect of the theory, i.e. that people care relatively less 
about fairness the higher the stakes in the game. 
12 Empirically, the predictive power of models incorporating social preferences has been assessed using the 
ultimatum game (in conjunction with other games). Examples are Bolton and Ockenfels (2005) and Blanco et al. 
(2011). 
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alternating offer game with a second-round pie 2p  at the level 2 1 / 4p p= , with 1p  denoting 
the first-round pie. In other words, in the design of Binmore et al. (1985) delaying an 
agreement implied an efficiency loss of 75%. The authors concluded from their findings that, 
except for the special case of one-round ultimatum offers, game-theoretic backward induction 
based on standard preference assumptions is a reasonable prediction, especially after allowing 
for some (minimal) learning. The conclusion inspired a very active experimental tradition of 
alternating offer games, usually based on “shrinking pies”, i.e., delay of an agreement is 
costly. 
One major result of this literature (see the early surveys of Güth and Tietz, 1990, and 
Roth, 1995) is that backward induction, based on more or less commonly known material 
opportunism, is hardly ever in line with the experimentally observed behavior. This is most 
convincingly demonstrated first by using the mouse-lab technique (Johnson et al., 2002) 
revealing that when submitting earlier offers, participants have not yet retrieved the pie sizes 
of later rounds. However, proper backward induction requires knowledge of the pie sizes in 
later rounds. 
Güth and Tietz (1985, 1986) questioned backward induction even for the simple case of 
two rounds, only by imposing either a radically shrinking pie ( 2 1 /10p p= ), or an almost not-
at-all-shrinking pie ( 2 19 /10p p= ). The game-theoretic prediction that one party should get 
only one tenth of the initial pie 1p  was never implemented; especially first-round proposers 
nearly never accepted that they should receive less (as in case of 2 19 /10p p= , where the first 
proposer should demand only 1/10 of 1p ). Unfair first-round offers were rejected even when 
it was impossible to earn the offered amount in later rounds (see Ochs and Roth, 1989, and the 
discussion in Roth, 1995). Learning, for example by allowing to play, first, the last subgame, 
then, the second-to-last subgame etc. (see Neelin et al., 1998), usually does not lead to 
behavior consistent with backward induction. 
Finally, delaying an agreement must not always be costly. When, for example, later 
agreements can be conditioned more specifically on environmental aspects, it may be helpful 
to wait before striking a deal. Güth et al. (1993) explored, first, in(de)creasing, then, 
de(in)creasing pie sizes in addition to the usual declining “pies” and found that participants 
usually strive for an agreement in the round when the pie size is maximal. Thus, it seems that 
decision makers are guided by strong equality as well as efficiency concerns.13 
                                            
13 Some more subtle aspects of alternating offer experiments are discussed by Roth (1995). 
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Another question that was of considerable interest in the 1980ies and 1990ies was 
learning in repeated play of the identical basic game, implemented as a stranger design 
(changing pairs) in order to rule out reputational concerns among players. Recently, Cooper 
and Dutcher (2011) provide evidence in a meta-study (see also Lin and Sunder, 2002) that 
behavior in repeated ultimatum games with stranger interaction seems similar to learning a 
norm, where offers have to hit some threshold to be accepted. With experience, acceptance 
rates of low offers even decline. Similarly, a recent learning experiment asking participants to 
play 100 rounds of standard ultimatum experiments using a random strangers design revealed 
a very quick convergence to proposers offering and responders demanding an equal share 
(Avrahami et al., 2010), i.e., behavior did not converge to backward induction play.14 
Gale et al.’s (1995) learning paper focuses almost exclusively on the ultimatum game, 
whereas Roth and Erev (1995) provide more general evidence of learning in extensive form 
games. Nevertheless, the ultimatum game was mentioned more than 60 times in their study 
(again excluding the reference list). Without looking at the large subsequent literature on 
learning in games in detail, one sees that the ultimatum game and the experimental studies 
based on it influenced learning research in economics to a considerable extent. 
 
4.2 Modifying the one-round game 
Here we refrain from reviewing the large literature on dictator giving (see Roth, 1995, and 
Camerer, 2003, for reviews). Mostly, they confirm the findings of the early reward allocation 
experiments (Mikula, 1973; Shapiro, 1975) that allocator participants are often guided by own 
intrinsic fairness concerns (Forsythe et al., 1994), but that dictator giving depends on the 
details of the interaction (Cherry et al., 2002) 
It is important to note that many of the dictator game experiments depart quite a bit from 
the ultimatum game. In the ultimatum game the responder cannot only veto a proposal, but 
also implicitly voice his disagreement, since the proposer is finally informed about the 
responder’s reaction. Many dictator experiments were run by not only taking away the veto 
power of the recipient, but also by rendering the recipient voiceless. In our view, when 
directly comparing the ultimatum game and the dictator game, one should allow recipient 
participants to accept or reject what is given to them and inform allocator participants about 
the reaction of their recipient (Bolton and Zwick, 1995, use the term “impunity game”). This 
procedure avoids that participants are forced to accept every gift that they get. 
                                            
14 Learning speed in ultimatum games is discussed in Cooper et al. (2003). Armentier (2006) studies learning in 
an ultimatum game in which participants receive large and widely unequal initial endowments. 
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For the following overview of ultimatum game modifications, a more general 
characterization of the game will be helpful. Consider that the responder’s decision 
( ) { }, 0,1x yδ ∈ , about which the allocator X should be informed, may imply earnings 
( ) ( ), 1 ,x y x x y xδ δ α+ −    for proposer X and ( ) ( ), 1 ,x y y x y yδ δ β+ −    for responder Y, 
with [ ], 0,1α β ∈ . This apparently features the ultimatum game as a special case of a two-
dimensional class of games with 0α β= = . 
Suleiman (1996) explored the subclass of α β= -games and could show that weaker veto 
power (i.e., larger α β= -parameters) suffices to induce fair outcomes.15 Fellner and Güth 
(2003) studied the subclass of 1α β+ = -games to investigate different degrees of punishment 
efficiency and to supplement the earlier studies of corner games (see Bolton and Zwick, 1995, 
and Güth and Huck, 1997) with { }, 0,1α β ∈ , rather than [ ], 0,1α β ∈ . The general message is 
that even without punishment power ( )1α = , responder recipients can expect some generosity 
( )0y > , but that punishment efficiency, measured by the ratio of what X and Y lose in case 
of ( ), 0x yδ = , can be crucial. This ratio is partly endogenous and only partly dependent on 
the exogenously imposed parameters α  and β , due to /x yα β . 
Another possibility to view the ultimatum game as a boundary case of a (this time one-
dimensional) class of games has been theoretically and experimentally explored by Fischer et 
al. (2006). The game class is based on the assumption that both parties X and Y independently 
determine choices x , respectively y , satisfying 0 ,x y p≤ ≤ , and that the implication of Y’s 
demand depends on a chance move, namely whether (i) it serves as an acceptance threshold in 
the sense that Y gets p x−  if p x y− ≥  with conflict otherwise or whether (ii) it is a demand 
meaning that Y earns y if x y p+ ≤  with conflict otherwise. 
Such a setup obviously allows to continuously connecting the ultimatum game to the 
demand game, studied by Nash (1950), via the probability for (i), respectively the 
complementary probability for (ii). Applying equilibrium selection (Harsanyi and Selten, 
1988), all games can be solved uniquely, showing how the solution outcomes vary 
continuously from full exploitation ( y  close to 0 ) to fair outcomes ( )/ 2y p= , when the 
                                            
15 Güth and Kovács (2001) allow Y participants to buy veto power, in the sense of 1α β= <  instead of 
1α β= = . 
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probability for (ii) increases from 0 to 1. Behaviorally, however, equal splitting ( )/ 2y p= is 
much more persistent, as could have been expected from earlier ultimatum experiments. 
More philosophically or methodologically speaking, viewing the ultimatum game as a 
boundary case of a larger game class allows to compare different games experimentally by 
using the same verbal instructions and distinguishing treatments only by numerical parameters 
(α  and β , or the probability for (i), respectively (ii) from above). This could help to limit 
implicit and explicit demand effects and to apply and explore the principle of approximate 
truth (Brennan et al., 2008) also behaviorally in order to investigate whether discontinuities 
result when parameters approach the limits.16 
Focusing again on the standard ultimatum game with 0α β= = , a dramatic effect on the 
set of equilibria follows, when not informing Y participants about the offer ( ),x y  chosen by 
their X participant. Imposing 0p y≥ >  means that Y should always accept ( )1δ = . 
Consequently, proposer X should only offer the smallest (positive) amount. The first 
laboratory study of the so-called Yes-No game confirmed the theoretical prediction for Y, 
however observed offers y lower than ultimatum offers but larger than dictator gifts (Gehrig et 
al., 2007). In contrast, a later study with two possible pie sizes elicited a few 0δ = -reactions 
(Güth and Kirchkamp, forthcoming). The main reason for choosing 0δ =  seems to be some 
form of group solidarity in the sense of “as responders, we once in a while should punish to 
prevent escalating exploitation by proposers”, i.e., of responders voluntarily providing a 
“public good” for all Y participants via rejecting “the pig in the poke”. 
A more recent variation assumes that proposer X chooses the pie size ,p p p ∈    from 
some generic interval with 0 p p< < . The choice can be accepted ( )( )1pδ =  or rejected 
( )( )0pδ =  by responder Y, and the pie allocation is determined by imposing a positive 
agreement payoff for one party and featuring the other party as the residual claimant. In case 
of Y as the residual claimant, proposer X earns the exogenously given amount x  and Y earns 
y p x= −  in case of ( ) 1pδ = , whereas both earn nothing in case of ( ) 0pδ = , i.e., X gets 
                                            
16 Folk theorems for infinitely repeated base games with a unique equilibrium (for example, prisoners’ dilemma 
games) claim such a discontinuity (for finite horizons, there exists one subgame perfect equilibrium, whereas the 
set of such equilibria explodes when assuming an infinite horizon). Behaviorally, this discontinuity does not 
exist (except for the so-called endgame effect; participants are cooperating even when the horizon is finite and 
commonly known; see Selten and Stöcker, 1986). 
 13 
( )p xδ and Y earns ( )( )p p xδ − . Here, for example in Güth et al. (2012), the parameters 
satisfy 0 2x p x p< < < < . In case of X as the residual claimant, the payoffs are ( )( )p p yδ −  
for X and ( )p yδ  for Y, where now y is exogenously given, and one is naturally interested in 
the parameterization 0 2y p y p< < < < . If Y is the residual claimant, the game is called 
“generosity game”. In contrast, when X is the residual claimant, the game is termed “envy 
game”. 
Both classes of games are especially suited to assess the type and the strength of other-
regarding concerns, especially of inequity aversion or equity liking (Homans, 1961; 
Loewenstein et al., 1989; Bolton, 1991; Bolton and Ockenfels, 1998, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999), or efficiency seeking. Actually, the two-modal results are 2p x= , respectively 2p y=
, and p p= , with the latter mode clearly dominating the former one. Thus, when it is possible 
to grant one party more without own sacrifice, decision makers are guided by efficiency to a 
greater extent than by equality concerns (Güth et al., 2009, 2012; Bäker et al., 2010). 
 
4.3 Make it three or more players 
There are several interesting ways to add players to the standard two-player ultimatum game. 
In proposer competition, at least two X players make an offer y to the single responder Y, who 
naturally will choose the largest offer, meaning that competition grants almost the entire pie 
( )0p >  to the responder (see Roth et al., 1991). In responder competition at least two Y 
players set their acceptance threshold determining whether or not they accept the offer y of the 
only X player, where in case of more than one acceptance the Y player with the lowest 
threshold is selected (see Güth et al., 1998).17 
In such games, there is no allocation that yields the same earnings to all players. Note that 
in proposer, respectively responder competition at least one X, respectively Y player is left 
empty-handed. Such inherent asymmetry apparently reduces the implicit demand of equal 
earnings for those actively striking a deal (in proposer, respectively responder competition, 
the only responder, respectively proposer receives considerably more than / 2p ). In a world 
                                            
17 One can also have more than two players and allow to endogenously expelling one (see Fischer and Güth, 
2012, where proposers can expel one of two responders). Bereby-Meyer and Niederle (2005) use a three-person 
ultimatum game with different rejection payoffs for the third person that questions some aspects of existing 
fairness theories. Fischbacher et al. (2009) also study the effects of competition on behavior in bargaining. 
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in which unequal payoffs are unavoidable, the otherwise strong equality concerns seem to be 
much weaker. 
The latter finding is also revealed by the results of three-person generosity and envy 
games with exogenously given agreement payoffs ,x z  of the proposer X and the additional 
dummy player Z, respectively ,y z  of responder Y and dummy player Z with 
0 x z p p< + < < , respectively 0 y z p p< + < < . If p  is large enough, i.e., ( )3 / 2p x y> +  
respectively ( )3 / 2p x z> +  (see Güth et al., 2010, as well as Bäker et al., 2011), and if x z≠
, respectively y z≠ , the mode of choices is p p= . Thus, in case of unavoidable inequality, 
the main concern becomes efficiency. However, when x z= , respectively y=z, the main 
mode is equality, i.e., 3 3p x z= = , respectively 3 3p y z= = . More generally, if general 
equality is feasible, it is usually implemented. 
Compared to proposer and responder competition, such three-person generosity games 
and envy games increase the number of players by increasing the variety of player types. In 
addition to proposer X and responder Y, there is a dummy player Z without any direct 
influence on the allocation of resources. Three-person ultimatum-like games were inspired by 
the experiment of Güth and van Damme (1998), who let X allocate a given pie ( )0p >  by 
choosing ( ), ,x y z  with , , 0x y z ≥  and x y z p+ + = . They not only elicited the responses 
( ) { }, , 0,1x y zδ ∈  but also the responses ( ) { }0,1yδ ∈  and ( ) { }0,1zδ ∈  via treatments where 
responder Y is only incompletely informed about ( ), ,x y z , namely by learning only y, 
respectively z. 18 A striking result was that neither proposer X nor responder Y seemed to care 
much about the dummy player (see Bolton and Ockenfels, 1998, who focus on this 
observation), although a later newspaper experiment revealed some concerns for the dummy 
player Z (Güth et al., 2007). 
Other variations distinguish an “only proposer” X, an “ambivalent” Y, and an “only 
responder” Z, meaning that, for example, X demands x with [ ]0,x p∈  from a given positive 
pie p. In case of the choice of ( ) 0xδ =  by Y the game ends with zero payoffs for all, whereas 
for ( ) 1xδ =  player Y becomes the proposer for the residual pie ( )0p x− ≥ . Thus, after 
                                            
18 In their experiment they, unfortunately, did not allow the dummy player Z to accept or reject only what is 
given to him (with the other two players learning the choice of Z). Hence, the setup rendered the dummy Z not 
only choiceless but also voiceless. 
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( ) 1xδ = , player Y demands y from p x− , to what Z reacts by choosing ( ) { }, 0,1x yρ ∈ .19 
The payoff of such two-level ultimatum games are ( ) ( ) ( ) for X, ,  for Yx x x x y yδ δ ρ  and 
( ) ( )( ),  for Zx x y p x yδ ρ − −  (Güth et al., 1996). The main novelty here is the ambiguous 
player Y who, in relation to X, is a responder and, in relation to Z, a proposer. Such a setup 
allows comparing the acceptance behavior of Y with his or her own proposal making, similar 
to employing the strategy vector method (see, for example, the newspaper experiment of Güth 
et al. 2003).20 Furthermore, what Y chooses in a two-level ultimatum game is strongly 
influenced by the example x  of player X.21 
Apparently, the ultimatum game provides a good starting point for tackling new research 
questions by varying its basic design via changing the choice sets, the information conditions, 
the number of players, and the variety of player types. 
 
 
5. From the turn of the century until now 
Even if we restrict the time horizon to only the 14 years from 2000 until 2013 (less than half 
of the time since the first publication of an ultimatum bargaining experiment), we end up with 
almost 200 scholarly articles in journals that are listed in the Social Science Citation Index 
using the term “ultimatum game” in the title. The number clearly shows that the ultimatum 
game is still a very important workhorse in behavioral economics and psychology research. In 
the following we provide a subjectively selected review of the main topics addressed in these 
papers and the major results of the studies. In the interest of space, it is not possible to 
summarize all findings in these studies in detail. 
 
                                            
19 One may inform Z only about y rather than about (x,y) so that ( ) { }0,1∈yρ , i.e., Z only learns what is offered 
to him or her. 
20 What early consistency tests (see the respective discussion in Güth, 1995) and the newspaper experiments 
reveal are different types of behavior: some participants would not accept their own offer, others accept nothing 
less than what they offer, and finally some offer more than what they minimally demand for themselves. 
21 Having groups decide in the role of proposers and responders, rather than individuals, has fueled team research 
in economics (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998; Elbittar et al., 2011; a survey is provided by Kugler et al., 2012). For 
reasons of succinctness, we do not discuss those studies in detail. 
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5.1 Fairness perceptions and emotions 
Although the ultimatum game is asymmetric by nature, one can further increase or decrease 
asymmetry by introducing asymmetry in conflict payoffs, outside options to be chosen or 
waved before playing the game, and asymmetries in information and communication 
possibilities (Güth et al., 2001; Falk et al., 2003; Schmitt, 2004; Wichardt et al., 2009; 
Conrads and Irlenbusch, 2013). Naturally, such asymmetries favor those who are advantaged 
and disfavor the players in the disadvantaged role. In Conrads and Irlenbusch (2013), the 
proposer can remain ignorant about the payoff of the responder. Indeed, the proposers benefit 
from such ignorance because responders accept almost every offer. 
Norm and fairness perceptions trigger emotional arousal, when responders are confronted 
with an unfair offer. Grimm and Mengel (2011) use an ultimatum game to show that an 
exogenously imposed cooling-off period before deciding about acceptance or rejection has an 
effect on behavior. Such delay in decision making indeed reduces the proportion of rejected 
unfair offers. However, Tang et al. (2009), who let the delay be determined endogenously by 
the responders, observe that a self-inflicted delay, i.e., exerting self-control over one’s 
immediate emotions, is rarely chosen voluntarily. The opposite, decision making under time 
pressure in the ultimatum game, has been studied by Sutter et al. (2003), with rejection rates 
of responders becoming significantly higher under a tight than under a very weak time 
constraint. However, the effect vanishes with repetition. Cappelletti et al. (2011) show that 
time pressure leads to an increase in offers, whereas inducing cognitive load on decision 
makers does not have a significant effect on behavior compared to the standard ultimatum 
game. 
Other studies elicit fairness perceptions by additional independent tests or questionnaires 
(Carpenter, 2003; van Dijk et al., 2004), partly by differentiating which emotions and 
perceptions are actually activated when playing the game (Nelissen et al., 2009, 2010; 
Srivastava et al., 2009; van Dijke and de Cremer, 2011). Finally, the ultimatum game has 
been used to study fairness behavior after inducing incidental (i.e., unrelated) emotions before 
play (Harle and Sanfey, 2007; Bonini et al., 2011), after depleting the ego ressources of the 
decision makers (Halali et al., forthcoming), and even after sleep deprivation (Anderson and 
Dickinson, 2010). 
 
5.2 Social comparisons and information on previous play 
Social comparison has been studied in a wide range of games and paradigms in economic 
experiments. By providing and varying population feedback (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004) 
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social comparison and its impact have been assessed in the context of the ultimatum game. 
Some studies add further players to the game (Alewell and Nicklisch, 2009) or introduce an 
uncertain pie size (Moran and Schweitzer, 2008); others go beyond interpersonal comparisons 
and focus on intrapersonal comparisons (Handgraaf et al., 2003) and even intergenerational 
naïve advice and learning (Schotter and Sopher, 2007). The general finding of most papers in 
this area is that social comparison matters in the sense that it influences decision making in 
the ultimatum game significantly. Additionally, Schotter and Sopher (2007) provide evidence 
that advice, and also knowledge of the history of the play of the game by others, sharpen up 
expectations, leading to a tighter distribution of offers. 
 
5.3 Socio-demographic and individual determinants of play 
While, on the one hand, it is not surprising that economists are keen on documenting socio-
economic determinants of decision making in standard experimental games, it is nevertheless 
a bit surprising, on the other hand, that the issue of what are robust socio-economic 
determinants of behavior is far from being settled. Results with regard to age, gender, income 
and education effects are often inconclusive (recent contributions are, for instance, Saad and 
Gill, 2001; Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Solnick, 2001; Carpenter et al., 2005; Garcia-Gallego 
et al., 2012), especially if one takes a look at the overall picture over the last 30 years. 
Methodologically speaking, however, these results tend to become more and more reliable, 
with a steadily growing number of independent observations in single economic experiments, 
and especially with new methods such as newspaper experiments (Güth et al., 2003), 
incorporating experiments into large-scale or representative surveys (Bellemare et al., 2008; 
Exadaktylos et al., 2013), and internet experiments. Obviously, increasing numbers of 
observations within one consistent study are key for robustly assessing the impact of socio-
demographics on economic behavior in the experimental laboratory. 
Personal features of proposer and responder participants (such as names or other cues that 
modify social distance) also influence behavior in the ultimatum game in the predicted 
direction (Charness and Gneezy, 2008; Marchetti et al., 2011), and high-testosterone men 
reject low ultimatum offers (Burnham, 2007), as expected. Zak et al. (2009) administer 
testosterone and observe a significantly negative effect on offers. Emanuele et al. (2008) 
provide evidence for the relevance of serotonin: low platelet serotonin levels make people 
more likely to reject unfair ultimatum offers. 
The issue of cultural influences on behavior in the ultimatum game has always been a hot 
research topic, but comparisons have been quite unsystematic, so far. Again large-scale 
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studies with an international component could be helpful in answering open questions. 
Another way forward is conducting meta studies. Oosterbeek et al. (2004) provide results 
based on 37 papers with 75 results from ultimatum game experiments. However, potential 
differences in behavior cannot really be explained along the lines of well-known cultural 
classifications. Chen and Tang (2009) compare ultimatum bargaining behavior of Tibetans 
and ethnic Han Chinese and find that Tibetans are more likely to accept offers than their Han 
Chinese counterparts. Ferraro and Cummings (2007) run ultimatum game experiments with 
Hispanics and Navajo subjects in the US and find differences in behavior. Even though the 
percentage of equal split offers is remarkable among Spanish gypsies (above 90%) in a study 
by Brañas-Garza (2006), responders are willing to accept low offers very often in their 
strategy vector ultimatum game. 
The usefulness of the ultimatum game as a tool for understanding the economic behavior 
of small-scale societies has been demonstrated by Henrich (2000) and Henrich et al. (2001). It 
is used quite frequently in anthropology nowadays (e.g., Paciotti and Hadley, 2003; Bahry and 
Wilson, 2006). 
Bargaining among members of different cultures is another aspect that can readily be 
studied in the context of the ultimatum bargaining game. For instance, Chuah et al. (2007, 
2009) let Malaysian Chinese and UK subjects meet opponents of their own as well as of the 
other culture in an ultimatum game. Similarly, Boarini et al. (2009) let Indian and French 
subjects interact in an ultimatum game. 
 
5.4 Stakes and entitlements 
While stake size effects on proposer and responder behavior are generally small (for a 
complete overview of the early literature, see Camerer, 2003), Andersen et al. (2011), show 
that rejections go down with an increasing stake size. 
Introducing bargaining over another “currency”, i.e., over waiting time, reinforces 
previous results from standard ultimatum bargaining experiments (Berger et al., 2012), and 
creating stronger entitlements over the money by introducing a real-effort task shapes 
behavior in the predicted ways (Garcia-Gallego et al., 2008), as already mentioned above 
(section 3). 
 
5.5 Variation of the choice format 
Much of the discussion concerning “hot play” versus “cold play” – methodologically 
speaking, the difference between the direct response method and the strategy (vector) method 
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in economic experiments (see also Brandts and Charness, 2011) – relied on evidence from the 
ultimatum game (Brosig et al., 2003; McLeish and Oxoby, 2004). The results are mixed, 
however, with a tendency of increasing rejection rates of unfair offers under the direct 
response method. Obviously, this is in line with explanations that take emotions into account. 
Comparing deliberate play and random moves, Bolton et al. (2005) use specific versions of a 
mini-ultimatum game to study the impact of procedural fairness versus allocation fairness.  
An interesting and still not fully understood regularity in experiments using the strategy 
vector method are non-monotone acceptance thresholds. Interestingly, the phenomenon that 
advantageous offers above the equal split are rejected is very robust (see also section 3), 
although it is usually only a minority that exhibits such a behavior (Güth et al., 2003; Bahry 
and Wilson, 2006; Bellemare et al., 2008; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2008). In order to be able to 
infer preferences from decisions in a more suitable way Andreoni et al. (2003) convexify the 
decisions in an ultimatum game. Their findings are in the ballpark of previous studies: Half of 
the subjects can be classified as money maximizers, half reveal a preference for fairness. 
Experimentally separating fairness concerns and failure to play the subgame perfect 
equilibrium – by comparing a tournament bargaining structure with control treatments in an 
ultimatum game setup – Andreoni and Blanchard (2006) find that fairness and imperfect 
learning are about equally important in shaping behavior. 
Hoffman et al. (2000) use treatments that emphasize the interactive aspect of the game in 
the instructions for the proposers. Interestingly, there is a significant increase in proposals 
following the emphasis and not a decline as implied by the subgame perfect equilibrium of the 
game. Self-selection of interaction partners in the laboratory is rare. In the context of the 
ultimatum game, Holm and Engseld (2005) give proposers the chance to select their 
bargaining partners based on income and gender. Low-income responders and female 
responders are much more popular than high-income participants and males. 
Finally, Bühren et al. (2012) introduce a competitive framing in mini-ultimatum games 
utilizing chess puzzles, and they use chess players as their participants. While offers do not 
respond to the treatment variation (competitive versus neutral), accepting low offers is more 
prevalent in the competitive framing. 
 
5.6 (Pre-play) communication and messages 
Similar to the use of the ultimatum game as a workhorse for studying social comparison, the 
game has also been used extensively in order to explore varying forms of communication and 
their impact on behavior rather systematically. Both “cheap talk” (Xiao and Houser, 2005; 
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Zultan, 2012) and potential deception over private information aspects in the game (Boles et 
al., 2000; Croson et al., 2003; Lusk and Hudson, 2004; Koning et al., 2011) have been 
analyzed. Examples for the first form are persuasion and non-binding requests (Rankin, 2003; 
Andersson et al., 2010). 
Kriss et al. (forthcoming) compare explicit deception (lies about the pie size) and implicit 
deception (through actions) in an ultimatum game with asymmetric information on the pie 
size. Deception is very common in their study, and it is more prevalent when only explicit 
deception is available than when information is communicated implicitly. 
 
5.7 Brain imaging data, genetics, and evolution 
To our knowledge, Sanfey et al. (2003) were the first in scanning brain activity while showing 
the participants fair and unfair offers in the ultimatum game. Unfair offers led to activity in 
brain areas related to both emotional responses (anterior insula) and cognition (dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex). A heightened activity in the anterior insula for rejected unfair offers seems 
to reinforce questionnaire results that stress the important role of emotions in the ultimatum 
game.22 
Results from Wallace et al. (2007), based on a twin study, sparked the debate on the 
impact of nature and nurture on economic behavior. They find that more than 40% of the 
variation in subjects' rejection behavior in the ultimatum game can be explained by additive 
genetic effects. A somewhat similar general conclusion – i.e. that social preferences in the 
ultimatum game and related games are shaped by both prenatal and current biological 
factors – is provided in a study by Buser (2012), who uses digit ratios (2D:4D) and 
information on the menstrual cycle.23 
Rand et al. (2003) employ stochastic evolutionary game theory, where agents make 
mistakes when judging the payoffs and strategies of others, to show that natural selection 
favors fairness. An experiment provides empirical support for their theoretical findings 
 
 
6. What comes next? 
What to expect in the future? Exploring take-it or leave-it offer bargaining by multi-
dimensional proposals, as already attempted by the complex games in the original Güth et al. 
                                            
22 See also Boksem and De Cremer (2010). 
23 Further results on sex-hormone genes as well as a dopamine receptor gene and their association with 
bargaining in the ultimatum game are provided by Chew et al. (2013) and Zhong et al. (2010). 
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(1982) study, could be worthwhile when trying to disentangle how participants cognitively 
perceive such games and generate their decision behavior. Mostly, experimental researchers 
subscribe to the revealed preferences – more generally: motives – approach, meaning that 
they try to infer motives only from observed choice data. Doing so could be easier when the 
choice data are multi-dimensional.24 
Social embedding of an ultimatum game matters. In the two-round alternating offer 
experiment of Güth and Tietz (1985, 1986), behavior in the second-period ultimatum 
(sub)game, reached after rejecting the first-round offer, was very different when this implied a 
90%- (due to 2 1 /10p p= ) or only a 10%-efficiency loss (due to 2 19 /10p p= ). In the former 
case, participants were just trying to harm each other, whereas they behaved very similar as in 
usual (non-embedded) ultimatum experiments when the efficiency loss was minor. Similarly, 
the ultimatum game may be embedded socially, for example, by distinguishing an in-group 
and an out-group, varying the constellation of group origin. More specifically, both (proposers 
and responders) can come from the same group or both can come from different groups (see 
Zizzo, 2011, for a related study). Furthermore, being observed by an in-group or an out-group 
member while making a decision could be an interesting aspect for a study. Of course, it can 
be investigated with other games as well, although norm-guidedness renders such attempts 
especially interesting in the context of the ultimatum game. 
Ultimatum bargaining with incomplete information could experience a revival. Whereas 
so far, asymmetric information was mainly assumed by letting only the proposer know the pie 
size (see Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993), it is also conceivable that the responder is better 
informed.25 As in the theoretical analysis of Güth et al. (2004), one could, for instance, 
assume a sequential decision process in which, first, proposer X chooses x , i.e., what he 
demands for himself, and then the pie size ,p p p ∈    with 0 p p≤ <  is randomly chosen 
according to some positive density with carrier ,p p   , before, finally, Y learns about both, 
X’s demand x  and the pie size p . In the end, Y decides between ( , ) 0=x pδ  and ( ), 1x pδ =
, leading to payoffs ( ),x p xδ  for X and ( )( ),x p p xδ −  for Y. 
                                            
24 The data of principal-agent experiments allowing the principal to propose a multi-dimensional contract or to 
discriminate between heterogeneous agents who can react by (non-)acceptance or high and low effort levels may 
be seen as a continuation of such attempts. 
25 The „acquiring-a-company“ game of Bazerman and Samuelson (1983) is a game in this class. The “buyer” 
does not know the value of the firm when proposing a price that the “seller”, knowing the value of the firm, can 
accept or reject (see the related experiment of Dittrich et al., 2012). 
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When x p>  is possible, one may be especially interested in cases x p> , for example, 
with p x−  negative and p  rather large: will responder Y accept the minor loss p x−  to give 
the large amount x  to X? The results of generosity game and envy game experiments suggest 
such responder generosity, especially when x  does not exceed half of the expected pie size. 
On the other hand, suffering a monetary loss for the other’s sake seems unlikely. Choosing a 
take-it or leave-it offer not knowing yet how much is available and what the other, i.e., the 
responder, will accept should render ultimatum bargaining not only more realistic but also 
more exciting. 
As indicated above, the ultimatum game is just a special point, namely ( ) ( ), 0,0α β = , in 
the unit square of ,α β -bargaining games with payoffs ( ) ( ), 1 ,x y x x y xδ α δ+ −    for X and 
( ) ( ), 1 ,x y y x y yδ β δ+ −    for Y. Exploring the whole class ( ) [ ] [ ], 0,1 0,1xα β ∈  rather 
systematically seems futile, although varying only α  or only β  for some (generic) value of 
the other parameter or of both like in Suleiman (1996) and Fellner and Güth (2003) can be 
interesting and might promote an awareness of how special the ultimatum game is. In 
experimental research, we rely often on special paradigms, for example symmetric games, 
rather than on generic ones which could approximate the degenerate paradigms when they are 
seen as especially interesting. 
There are lots of conceivable methodological innovations that could advance our 
knowledge of bargaining based on the ultimatum game. We have already mentioned the 
potential advantage of large-scale studies. An internet experiment on the ultimatum game with 
thousands of participants would allow to address the impact of socio-demographic and socio-
economic determinants of play. We are also not aware of studies that link laboratory 
bargaining behavior with field bargaining behavior. In general, field experiments on 
bargaining are very rare. Obviously, there is ample room for research. 
It is also interesting to emphasize the interdisciplinary path that the ultimatum game has 
taken. We have only superficially sampled the literature outside of economics and 
psychology. It is noteworthy that at least an equal share of the scholarly contributions that use 
the ultimatum game as a workhorse in the last 14 years comes from non-economics journals. 
Many different disciplines and sub-disciplines have adopted the game as an important tool to 
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study fairness in bargaining. Its simplicity when implementing it makes it useful for a very 
versatile deployment in experimental research.26 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
In view of the already existing summary chapters in handbooks (for example, Roth, 1995) and 
textbooks on experimental economics (for example Camerer, 2003, Chaudhuri, 2009) and 
even meta-analyses of ultimatum studies (for example, Cooper and Dutcher, 2001), the focus 
of this paper has been the architecture of social interaction that can be captured by the 
ultimatum game and its modifications. We have also tried to provide a selective overview of 
research based on the ultimatum game that has been conducted after the turn of the century. 
When performing the first ultimatum bargaining experiments, there was already a very 
active group of experimental researchers. Ultimatum bargaining has added to their existing 
research rather than starting from scratch. As being revealed by Güth (1976), ultimatum 
bargaining has been in the air even before actually being experimentally explored. 
As far as we are concerned, observing that human decision makers are not only and 
mainly interested in own material success was not a big surprise but something that had to be 
expected. What could not easily be anticipated is how socially, motivationally, and 
emotionally rich already the very simple ultimatum game turned out to be. As a consequence, 
we still do not fully understand when and why we submit certain take-it or leave-it offers and 
how we react to them. In view of this, it has to be expected that the already impressive 
tradition of ultimatum bargaining research will continue in the future. 
  
                                            
26 We have provided a list of examples that is by far not exhaustive (for instance we did not discuss the power-
to-take game experiments; see Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Bosman et al. 2005; Ben-Shakhar et al., 2007; 
Sutter et al., 2009; Reuben and van Winden, 2010; or stronger deviations from the standard setup such as the 
ultimatum reciprocity measure in Nicklisch and Wolff, 2012). Many more extensions are possible and have been 
implemented. 
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